Personal Injury Torts between Spouses by McCurdy, William E.
Volume 4 Issue 3 Article 1 
1959 
Personal Injury Torts between Spouses 
William E. McCurdy 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr 
 Part of the Family Law Commons, and the Torts Commons 
Recommended Citation 
William E. McCurdy, Personal Injury Torts between Spouses, 4 Vill. L. Rev. 303 (1959). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol4/iss3/1 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital 
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Villanova Law Review by an authorized editor of Villanova 
University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. 
Villanova Law Review
VOLUME 4 SPRING, 1959 NUMBER 3
PERSONAL INJURY TORTS BETWEEN SPOUSES
WILLIAM E. MCCURDY f
A MARRIED WOMAN may have been injured by her husband
by conduct which if it had injured a person not his wife would
be actionably tortious; or a married man may have suffered such in-
jury from acts of his wife. Such acts may have arisen from or have
been connected with marital relation; injuries may have been inflicted
intentionally and wilfully; carelessness may have occurred in the oper-
ation of the domestic establishment or of the family automobile and
there may or may not have been liability insurance. The fact that
the injured person and the person causing the injury were husband
and wife may have been co-incidental; or one spouse may have injured
the other while acting as servant or employee of a third person. Or
tortious injury to one spouse caused by the other may have occurred
prior to marriage, as for example when one i's injured by the other's
negligent operation of an automobile and the parties later marry. Do
causes of action in tort arise and are civil remedies that would be
available to persons not husband and wife available to one spouse
against the other? *
I.
At common law a woman upon marriage continued to own prop-
erty which she owned at such time,' with the exception of chattels
t Professor of Law, Harvard University.
* For an earlier discussion see McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic
Relation, 43 HARV. L. Rev. 1030, 1041 (1930).
For a discussion of property torts see McCurdy, Property Torts Between Spouses
and Use During Marriage of the Matrimonial Home Owned by the Other, 2 VILL.
L. Rev. 447 (1957).
1. Clapp v. Stoughton, 27 Mass. (10 Pick.) 463 (1830); Beale v. Knowles,
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personal which became her husband's by operation of law.2 The hus-
band acquired certain rights in her other property,8 among which was
the right during coverture to reduce to possession, and then keep as
his own, the proceeds of her choses and rights in action.4 She also
continued subject to antenuptially incurred obligations and liabilities.5
With similar effect a woman during marriage had legal capacity to
acquire and own6 (except that the husband had an unqualified right to
her services and earnings;' he also came under a duty to support)."
A married woman had no capacity to contract,' but for tortious injury
to her person she acquired a right of action,'" and for her own tortious
acts she became liable." But she had no capacity to sue or be sued.
If a right or liability or obligation sought to be enforced or redressed
during coverture was substantively hers, action was brought by or
against her in the joint names of husband and wife.'2 The usual appli-
cation of this joinder was in actions to obtain judgments for ante-
nuptial debts owed the wife'" and for tortious injury to the wife caused
by a third person (either antenuptial or during marriage).' 4 Con-
versely, if a woman was a debtor' 5 or subject to a tort liability' e at
the time of marriage, or after marriage committed a tort,' T since the
liability was substantively hers but she lacked capacity to be sued in
her own name, husband and wife would be joined as parties defendant.
A judgment if obtained during coverture belonged to or became the
obligation of the husband. If marriage terminated before judgment,
the right or liability remained that of the woman.'
2. Jordan v. Jordan, 52 Me. 320 (1864).
3. See Haskins, The Estate by the Marital Right, 97 U. PA. L. Rlv. 345 (1949).
4. Wells v. Tyler, 25 N.H. 340 (1852).
5. See Edwards v. Porter, [1925] A.C. 1.
6. Concord Bank v. Bellis, 64 Mass. (10 Cush.) 276 (1852); Wells v. Tyler,
25 N.H. 340 (1852).
7. Clapp v. Stoughton, 27 Mass. (10 Pick.) 463 (1830).
8. French v. McAnarney, 290 Mass. 545, 195 N.E. 714 (1935) ; Ritchie v. White,
225 N.C. 450, 35 S.E.2d 414 (1945) (32 VA. L. Rv. 407).
9. Lowell v. Daniels, 68 Mass. (2 Gray) 161 (1854); Lloyd v. Lee, 1 Str. 94
(1795). Cf. Gregory v. Pierce, 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 478 (1842).
10. Laughlin v. Eaton, 54 Me. 156 (1866); Dengate v. Gardner, 4 M. & W. 5
(1838); Guy v. Livesey, Cro. Jac. 501.
11. Marshall v. Oakes, 51 Me. 308 (1864); Bryant v. Smith, 187 S.C. 453, 198
S.E. 20 (1938).
12. Bishop v. Readsboro Chair Mfg. Co., 85 Vt. 141, 81 Atd. 454 (1911).
13. Jordan v. Jordan, 52 Me. 320 (1864).
14. Laughlin v. Eaton, 54 Me. 156 (1866); Dengate v. Gardner, 4 M. & W. 5
(1838).
15. Cole v. Shurtleff, 41 Vt. 311 (1868).
16. Hawk v. Harman, 5 Binn. 43 (Pa. 1812).
17. Edwards v. Porter, [1925] A.C. 1 (2 CAMB. L.J. 250; 38 HARV. L. Rnv.
1114; 20 ILL. L. Rgv. 80; 29 L.N. 76; 21 L.Q. REv. 543; 34 YALE L.J. 543).
18. Capel v. Powell, 17 C.B. (N.S.) 743 (1864); Heard v. Stamford, 3 P.W.
409 (1715); Rigley v. Lee, Cro. Jac. 356.
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Since a married woman lacked capacity to contract with third
persons or to sue or be sued in her own name, it would follow that
she could not contract or enter into transactions with her husband,
or sue, or be sued by him. 9 But another reason or explanation for
such result was also advanced. Husband and wife were legally one
person, 20 and no person can contract with or sue himself. Consequently
these were disabilities of the husband (who was not otherwise under
disabilities as the result of marriage) as well as those of his wife. Not
only could they not sue one another for allegedly tortious conduct
but in accordance with this unity concept there could be no cause of
action, it would seem, anymore than there could come into existence
a contract between them.2 Causes of action for antenuptial torts com-
mitted by one against the other having come into existence (and there
being no incapacity to sue or be sued until marriage) were never-
theless extinguished upon marriage, 22 just as were antenuptial debts
of one to the other.23
Apart from the above and at a time when valid marriage could
terminate only by death, no action for personal injury tort between
spouses could be maintained after the marriage ended, for if it could
be contended that a cause of action arose in spite of coverture,
that the reason why no action would lie was only because of the neces-
sity of joinder of husband and wife as parties to the suit, and that
the procedural disability would end upon death, nevertheless no action
could be maintained thereafter because a cause of action for tort would
not survive the death of either party.24
Dissolution of valid marriage by divorce was not provided for
in England by general law until 1857 when Parliament enacted the
19. Jewell v. Porter & Rolfe, 31 N.H. 34 (1855) ; Firebrass v. Pennant, 2 Wils.
254 (1764).
20. See 1 BLACKSTONt, COMMtNTARIXS *430, 432, 433.
But the unity concept is inconsistent with most of the respective property rights
of the spouses at common law. It was applied in the criminal law to acts of the
one against the property of the other; but otherwise it was disregarded in criminal
law. It was not applied in non interspousal torts committed by or against the person
of a married woman. It was disregarded in courts of equity, and was not applicable
in the ecclesiastical courts in determinations of validity and invalidity of marriage
and in divorces a mensa et thoro. It rather serves to sum up a result reached. See
McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relation, 43 HARV. L. Rev. 1030,
1034, 1035 (1930); McCurdy, Property Torts Between Spouses and Use During
Marriage of the Matrimonial Home Owned by the Other, 2 VILL. L. Rv. 447, 450
(1957). See also Tooth v. Tillyer, [1956] Argus L.R. 891, where it was said that
"one may suppose that the conception of the unity of husband and wife was but an
ex post facto explanation and not a source of the state of early English law . . ."
referring to 4 BRACTON, Dt LtGIBUs, 335 (Woodbine ed. 1942) and to 2 POLLOCK &
MAITLAND, THl HISTORY Or ENGLISH LAW, 405-06 (2d ed. 1898).
21. Bassett v. Bassett, 112 Mass. 99 (1873).
22. See cases cited note 133 infra.
23. Chapman v. Kellogg, 102 Mass. 246 (1869) ; Powers v. Lester, 23 N.Y. 527
(1861).
24. See Phillips v. Barnet, L.R. 1 Q.B.D. 436 (1876).
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Matrimonial Causes Act which specified the grounds for divorce and
established a court with jurisdiction over such cases."
Could it now be thought that interspousal non-liability in tort
was a rule applicable only in interspousal suits?
In Phillips v. Barnet,26 which arose after the enactment of the
Act of 1857, it was held that no action after divorce could be brought
by a former wife against her former husband for alleged assaults and
batteries committed during coverture. Blackburn, J., reasoned: "I was
at first inclined to think, having regard to -the old procedure and the
form of pleas in abatement, that the reason why a wife could not sue
her husband was a difficulty as to parties; but I think that when one
looks at the matter more closely, the objection to the action is not
merely with regard to the parties, but a requirement of the law founded
upon the principle that husband and wife are one person. . . . [T]he
reason is not the technical one of parties, but because, being one per-
son, one cannot sue the other. Then does dissolution of the marriage
by divorce make that a cause of action which was not so before? I do
not see why it should." 27 Lush, J., expressed the same view. Field, J.,
added: "I think that we should be establishing a dangerous precedent
if we held that this action would lie." The reason why it would do
so is not explained.
Phillips v. Barnet was followed the next year in Maine in Abbott
v. Abbott2" where after divorce the former wife brought action against
her former husband and others for alleged assault and battery in
placing her forcibly and wrongfully in an insane asylum. It was held
the action was not maintainable, the court saying: "The theory upon
which the present action is sought to be maintained is, that coverture
merely suspends and does not destroy the remedy of the wife against
her husband. But the error in the proposition is the supposition that
a cause of action or a right of action ever exists in such a case. There
25. 20 & 21 Vict. c. 85. Prior to that time and starting about 1669 a dissolution
divorce could be obtained only by act of Parliament. Jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical
courts extended only to declaring a marriage valid or invalid and to granting di-
vorces from bed and board. In the colonies, and later in the early days of the states,
matrimonial causes were dealt with by governor and council or by private act of
the legislature. General divorce statutes to be applied by the courts appeared earlier
than in England. Divorce by private statute has become obsolete. See McCurdy,
Divorce-A Suggested Approach With Particular Reference to Dissolution for Liv-
ing Separate and Apart, 9 VAND. L. Rev. 685, 686-89 (1956).
26. L.R. 1 Q.B.D. 436 (1876).
27. See also Tooth v. Tillyer, [1956] Argus L.R. 891: "... IT]hat conception [of
the unity of husband and wife] is as much inconsistent with the existence of a liability
of the one to the other as it is inconsistent with the existence of a remedy against
the other."
28. 67 Me. 304 (1877).
[VOL. 4: p. 303
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is not only no civil remedy but there is no civil right, during cover-
ture, to be redressed at any time. There is, therefore, nothing to be
suspended. Divorce cannot make that a cause of action which was
not a cause of action before divorce. The legal character of an act
of violence by husband upon wife and of the consequences that flow
from it, is fixed by the condition of the parties at the time the act
is done. If there is no cause of action at the time, there never can
be any." The court expressed the opinion that the plaintiff had remedy
enough in the criminal law, habeas corpus, and divorce, and that it
would be poor policy to grant the remedy sought. The policy referred
to may be, because of the context, an objection to multiplying litiga-
tion. It was also held that the co-defendants who allegedly helped
the husband were not liable since they had acted under his authority.2"
There was no suggestion that the reason why the husband was not
liable was because of a personal immunity.
At common law, therefore, the combination of the various inci-
dents of marriage, some substantive, some procedural, some con-
ceptual, made it impossible for one spouse ever to be held civilly
liable as a tortfeasor, 0 in any situation, and without exception, to the
other for any act, antenuptial or during marriage, causing personal
injury which would have been a tort but for the marriage."'
Is the matter of liability different as a result of Married Women's
Property (or Emancipation) statutes or related legislation? 32
II.
The first English Married Women's Property Act general in
scope was enacted in 1870.33 After making provision for holding and
29. Cf. Ewald v. Lane, 104 F.2d 222 (D.C. Cir. 1939) (25 CORNZLL L.Q. 312;
27 Gno. L.J. 991; 38 MIcH. L. Rev. 745) (holding that a third person would be liable
for conspiring with the husband to injure the wife).
30. Acts committed by husband or wife against the person of the other would
not necessarily be lawful. Some acts would be crimes, such as assaults and murder,
and punishable as such. Some would furnish grounds for divorce a mensa et thoro,
such as acts of extreme cruelty.
31. See McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relation, 43 HARV. L.
Riv. 1030 (1930).
32. The evolution of the doctrine of the married woman's equitable separate
estate (starting about the beginning of the Eighteenth Century and forecasting the
later married women's statutes of the next century) developed important modifications
in matters of property and contract but did not operate in matters of tort beyond
injuries to or interference with the separate estate, and then on equitable principles
in controversies including those between the wife and her husband. See McCurdy,
Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relation, 43 HARV. L. REv. 1030, 1035 (1930) ;
McCurdy, Property Torts Between Spouses and Use During Marriage of the Matri-
monial Home Owned by the Other, 2 VILL. L. Rtv. 447, 450-53 (1957).
33. 33 & 34 Vict. c. 93 (1870).
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acquiring certain separate property, it provided 4 that a married woman
"shall have in her own name the same remedies, both civil and crim-
inal, against all persons whomsoever for the protection and security
of such [separate property] as if such . . .property belonged to an
unmarried woman ...."
The Married Women's Property Act of 1882 3 -- considered the
basic English Act--enlarged the scope of the separate estate and pro-
vided that every married woman "shall have in her own name against
all persons, including her husband, the same civil remedies and also
(subject, as regards her husband, to the proviso hereinafter contained) 3"
the same remedies and redress by way of criminal proceedings, for
the protection and security of her own separate property, as if such
property belonged to her as a femme sole, but, except as aforesaid,
no husband or wife shall be entitled to sue the other for a tort. ... ,, I3
It is clear that under this statute neither husband nor wife can
sue the other for a personal injury tort3" committed during marriage.39
Married women's property statutes were enacted by a few legis-
latures in the United States prior to 1850.40 Thereafter a steady
progression of such enactments in those and other states occurred,
some states amending and extending their statutes several times.4'
Most of the earlier statutes were modeled upon the equitable separate
estate doctrine but made the statutory estate a legal one and made
changes in some of the inherent shortcomings of the equitable estate.
In Peters v. Peters,4" an action was brought by a wife against
her husband for assaults and batteries alleging that he had been con-
34. 33 & 34 Vict. c. 93 § 11 (1870).
35. 45 & 46 Vict. c. 75 (1882).
36. The proviso contains limitations upon criminal proceedings taken by the
wife against her husband concerning acts of the husband in reference to her property:
no such proceeding while living together, nor while living apart for conduct while
living together except done when leaving or deserting or about to do so.
Section 16 contains similar limitations in reference to the husband.
37. 45 & 46 Vict. c. 75 § 12 (1882). The Married Women's Property Act, 1893,
56 & 57 Vict. c. 63, deals with contracts and wills. The Law Reform (Married
Women and Tortfeasors) Act. 1935, 25 & 26 Geo. 5, c. 30, abolished the husband's
liability for his wife's antenuptial contracts and torts and her postnuptial torts, which
the Act of 1882 in § 14 had limited. It also reaffirms § 12 of the Act of 1882.
38. See for property torts, McCurdy, Property Torts Between Spouses and Use
During Marriage of the Matrimonial Home Owned by the Other, 2 VILL. L. Rev. 447,
454 (1957).
39. The statute does not specifically deal with actions after dissolution of marriage.
Would the reasoning in Phillips v. Barnet remain applicable? See Broom v. Morgan
[1953] 1 Q.B. 597. Cf. Curtis v. Wilcox [1948] 2 K.B. 474.
40. Me. Laws, c. 117 (1844); Mass. Laws, c. 208 (1845); N.H. Laws, c. 327
(1846) ; N.Y. Laws, c. 200 (1848).
41. See Bryant v. Smith, 187 S.C. 453, 198 S.E. 20 (1938).
42. 42 Iowa 182 (1875).
[VOL. 4: p. 303
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victed of the offense and that she had been forced to leave him. The
Iowa Code (section 2211) provided that "a wife may . . . prosecute
and defend all actions at law or in equity, for the preservation and
protection of her property rights, as if unmarried." Section 2204
provided that either husband or wife could maintain an action for
his or her property against the other (who had obtained possession
and control of it) "in the same manner and extent as if they were
unmarried." It was held that the action for assault and battery could
not be maintained, since the statute contained no provisions for it.
Section 2204 controlled actions between spouses, and Section 2211
applied only in respect to actions by or against third persons. The
contention that a personal injury tort action was property was re-
jected: such action is not property unless the action will lie, and the
action will not lie unless it is property. There is no reference in the
opinion to any considerations of policy furthering marital harmony.
But in an earlier case in a New York lower court, Longendyke v.
Longendyke, 3 conjugal tranquillity had been referred to. There it was
also held that a wife could not maintain an action against her husband
for assault and battery. New York Laws of 1860 provided "married
women may sue and be sued in all matters relating to their property
and may bring actions to recover damages to their person or character,
against any person or body corporate, which damages when so re-
covered shall be their sole and separate property." The court was
of the opinion that although the words of the statute might literally
be read to confer the right of action contended for, it did not do so
since it was only a property act; to apply it literally would be con-
trary to policy and destructive of conjugal union and tranquillity,
and there might be perpetual controversies. The same result was
reached in Freethy v. Freethy" (an action for slander). New York
Laws 1862, section seven provided that "any married woman may
bring and maintain an action in her own name, for damages, against
any person, or body corporate, for any injury to her person or char-
acter, the same as if she were sole." The court reasoned that the
common law in the matter in question had not been changed by the
statute and observed there was nothing contained in it that would
authorize suits by husbands against their wives; moreover public
policy of fostering peace and happiness of the conjugal relation (par-
ticularly in alleged wrongs to character) precludes finding a legisla-
tive intent to make such a striking innovation, unless such intent is
43. 44 Barb. 366 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1863).
44. 42 Barb. 641 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1865).
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clearly manifested; it is not to be thought that the legislature would
leave it to the construction of the courts. In Schultz v. Schultz45 the
New York Supreme Court declined to follow these cases, observing
that ill treatment of the wife by the husband (assault) "is more de-
structive to conjugal union and tranquillity than the declaration of a
right in the wife to maintain an action against her husband" and that
it was not unlikely that such a right "would operate as a restraint
upon militant husbands." This ruling was, however, reversed in the
Court of Appeals without opinion.46 The later New York Domestic
Relation Law provided that "a married woman has a right of action
for an injury to her person, property or character or for an injury
arising out of the marital relation, as if unmarried." Again it was
held, Allen v. Allen,"8 without opinion,49 that an action by a wife
against her husband for malicious prosecution would not lie. In 1937
a statute was enacted50 amending the Domestic Relation Law to pro-
vide expressly that husband or wife has a right of action against the
other for wrongful or tortious acts resulting in injury to person or
property.
Married women's statutes have by now been enacted in every
state. A few of the statutes are closer to the common law in some
matters at least than are others, but most of the statutes are no longer
so closely confined to the model of the equitable separate estate, nor
deal exclusively with matters of separate property. Some are more
comprehensive than others. In addition to providing typically that
property owned by a woman at the time of marriage or acquired by
her during marriage shall be and remain hers in the same manner
and to the same extent as though she were unmarried, most of the
statutes deal variously with capacity to contract and to convey or
otherwise transfer, with services and earnings, and rights of action
and suits by and against married women. 51
45. 27 Hun 26 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1882).
46. 89 N.Y. 644 (1882).
47. N.Y. Dom. R4L. LAW (1916) § 57.
48. 246 N. Y. 571, 159 N.E. 656 (1927) (37 YALt L.J. 834).
49. Pound, J., dissenting in an elaborate opinion.
50. N.Y. Laws, c. 669 (1937). At the same time a provision was enacted amend-
ing the insurance law in respect to liability insurance.
See note 161 infra.
51. See McCurdy, Property Torts Between Spouses and Use During Marriage
of the Matrimonial Home Owned by the Other, 2 VILL. L. Riv. 447, 463 (1957).
See also Hagland, Tort Actions Between Husband and Wife, 27 Gto. L.J. 697, 724(1939) ; McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relations, 43 HARV. L. Rnv.
1030, 1036-7 (1930).
[VOL. 4: p. 303
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In most states it is provided that a married woman may (or can
or shall) sue (or be sued) as if (or in the same manner as if) single
(or unmarried).5 In some of these states she may sue, or be sued,
"separately" or "without joinder of her husband".5" In some she
may sue or be sued in her own name, 54 or alone.55 In Nevada she may
sue and be sued alone when living separate and apart from her
husband.5" Torts may or may not be mentioned. Some statutes ex-
pressly include them but in general terms ;57 some mention injuries
to person or character.58
The Texas statute provides that a married woman may sue and
be sued in her own name after disability of coverture is removed
with consent of her husband for mercantile or trading purposes.5 9
The Tennessee statute provides that a married woman is fully emanci-
pated from all disability on account of coverture. 0 In Alaska civil
disabilities of a married woman not recognized of her husband are
repealed ;61 in Minnesota she has the same rights as a woman as her
husband has as a man ;"2 in Oklahoma she has the same right to re-
52. ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 34 § 72 (1946); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 55-401 (1947);
CAL. CODE CIrv. PROC. § 370 (West Supp. 1956) ; COLO. Rev. STAT. ANN. § 90-2-2
(1953) ; CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46-9 (1958) ; DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 13, § 311 (1953);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 708.08 (1955) ; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 5-304 (Supp. 1955) ; IND.
ANN. STAT. § 38-115-105 (Supp. 1955); IOWA CODE R.C.P. 10 (1951); KAN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 60-404 (1949); Ky. CRIM. CODE PRAC. ANN. § 404.060 (Baldwin
1953) ; Mt. REv. STAT. ANN. C. 166, § 39 (1954) ; MD. ANN. CODE art. 45, § 5 (Supp.
1956); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 26-658 (Supp. 1956); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 451.290 (Supp.
1956); MONT. Rev. CoDEs ANN. §§ 36-128, 93-2803 (1947); NEB. Rev. STAT. §§
25-305, 25-306 (Supp. 1955); N.H. Rev.'STAT. ANN. § 460:2 (1955) ; N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 21-6-6 (Supp. 1955); N.D. REv. CoDE § 14-0705 (Supp. 1953) ; OHIO lgv.
CODE ANN. § 2307.09 (Page Supp. 1956) ; R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 15-4-14 (1956);
S.D. CODE § 14.0207 (1939) ; TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-601 (Supp. 1956) ; UTAH CODE
ANN. §§ 78-11-1, 30-2-4 (1953); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-36, 55-37 (1950); W. VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 4749, 4750 (1955) ; Wyo. COMP. STAT. ANN. §§ 50-203, 50-208, 3-604
(1945); D.C. CODE ANN. § 30-208 (1951).
53. CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 370 (West Supp. 1956); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-79
(1958) ; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 708.08 (1955); IOWA CoDE R.C.P. 10 (1951) ; ME. Rev.
STAT. ANN. C. 166, § 39 (1954); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 451.290 (Supp. 1956); S.D.
CODE § 14.0207 (1939); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 4749, 4750 (1955); D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 30-208 (1951).
54. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46-9 (1958); Mt. Rev. STAT. ANN. C. 166, § 39 (1954);
N.D. Rev. CODE § 14-0705 (Supp. 1953); Wis. STAT. § 246.07 (1955).
55. IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-204 (Supp. 1955); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 15-4-14
(1956).
56. Nev. CoMP. LAWS § 123.120 (Supp. 1949).
57. M. Rev. STAT. ANN. C. 166,-§ 39 (1954); MD. ANN. CoDE art. 45, § 5
(Supp. 1956) ; N.D. Rev. CODE § 14-0705 (Supp. 1953) ; S.D. CODE § 14.0207 (1939) ;
D.C. CODE ANN. § 30-208 (1951). See also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 311 (1953).
58. IND. ANN. STAT. § 38-115 (Supp. 1955).
59. Tex. Rv. Civ. STAT. art. 4626 (1948).
60. TENN. CoDE ANN. § 36-601 (Supp. 1956).
61. ALASKA ComP. LAWS ANN. §§ 21-2-11, 21-2-2 (1949).
62. MINN. STAT. § 519.01 (1953).
9
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cover for her injuries as the husband has for his ;" in Oregon all civil
rights that a husband has, his wife has also.64
Few statutes specifically refer to actions between the spouses.
In Arizona,"' Indiana 6 and South Carolina 67 a married woman may
sue alone when the action is between her and her husband. In Mis-
sissippi spouses may sue each other;as in Washington69 husband or
wife may maintain an action for property against the other as if un-
married.7 0
In Massachusetts 7' (also Hawaii) 7 2 suits between husband and
wife are not authorized (actions can be brought to the same extent
as before the statute, i.e., as at common law and equity). In New
Jersey the statute permits no suit between husband and wife except
as heretofore or herein authorized.73 In Pennsylvania no suit between
husband and wife is permitted except for divorce or to protect and
recover separate property or after the wife has been deserted.74 In
Georgia either husband or wife can recover for tort to the person
or reputation of the woman (a provision which seems referable to
injuries committed by a third person) -otherwise her legal civil
existence is merged in that of the husband."5
In only four states-Illinois,"6 New York,77 North Carolina, 8
and Wisconsin 79 -do the statutes contain provisions dealing expressly
with interspousal personal injury torts. They will be considered at
later points, after consideration of cases arising under other statutes.
Since a basic purpose of married women's statutes is to place a
married woman in respect to her property in the same position as
though she was not married not only with reference to outsiders but
in reference to her husband's interests therein and control thereof, it
would be a negation of such purpose not to afford her actions and
remedies for its protection and redress of injuries thereto. In a few
63. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 224; tit. 32, § 15 (Supp. 1956).
64. ORs. Rgv. STAT. § 108.010 (1955).
65. ARIZ. Rev. STAT. ANN., R.C.P. 17(e).
66. IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-204 (Supp. 1955).
67. S.C. CODE § 10-216 (1952).
68. Miss. CoDE ANN. § 452 (1942).
69. WASH. Rev. CoDR § 26.16.180 (Supp. 1956).
70. Cf. P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 32, § 304; tit. 31, § 286 (when deserted by her
husband or when action is between spouses the woman may sue or be sued alone).
71. MAss. ANN. LAWS c. 209, § 6 (Supp. 1956).
72. HAwAII Rev. LAWS §§ 325-5, 325-7 (1955).
73. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37: 2-5, 2-6, 2-8, 2-9 (1940).
74. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § Ill (1930).
75. GA. CODe ANN. § 53-511 (Supp. 1953).
76. ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 68, § 1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1953).
77. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 57. See also N.Y. INS. LAW § 167(3).
78. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-10.1.
79. Wis. STAT. § 246.075 (1955).
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jurisdictions she is in the position of a feme sole with reference to
third persons, but in the same position with reference to her husband
as she would have been in had her property been an equitable separate
estate (and the husband is similarly treated with reference to his
property). But in almost all states where the statute does not provide
differently a spouse has been afforded the same actions and remedies
against the other spouse as against third persons even though the
statute does not expressly deal with the matter.8" It is often said
that in property matters the unity concept has been abrogated, and
that the spouses have separate legal identities and are to this extent
strangers to each other. It is apparent, however, that these actions
can be as disruptive of domestic harmony, in some cases more so, than
actions for some types of personal injuries. But denial of the action
can also be disruptive and this can be equally so in some types of per-
sonal injuries.
In some of the states whose statutes do not deal specifically with
interspousal personal injury torts, it is clear that the statutes (for ex-
ample Massachusetts and New Jersey) are so worded as to preclude
or prohibit civil actions between husband and wife for any kind of
tortious personal injury (limiting redress to the criminal and divorce
law). It is also clear that some of the statutes in dealing with a
married woman's rights of action and liabilities for tort and capacity
to sue and be sued by using such terms as "separately" or "separate
from her husband" cover expressly only the position of the married
woman with respect to persons other than her husband. On the other
hand the statutes of some states while not dealing specifically with
personal injury torts between husband and wife do expressly permit
actions between them without mentioning any qualification. Many
married women's statutes, however, are worded in such a way that
no express distinction between property injuries and personal injuries
is made and the language is not referring to third persons only, but
actions between spouses are neither expressly prohibited nor expressly
recognized, and literally by not being excluded are included. The
terminology is simply broad and neutral.
By the weight of authority personal injury actions between spouses
have not been allowed by the courts. The common law has not been
changed unless the statute expressly or by necessary implication so
80. McCurdy, Property Torts Between Spouses and Use During Marriage of
the Matrimonial Home Owned by the Other, 2 VILL. L. REv. 447 (1957) ; McCurdy,
Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relation, 43 HARV. L. Rizv. 1030, 1037-41 (1930).
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provides."' Unity of husband and wife has been abrogated only as
to property. This conclusion is usually buttressed by stressing public
policy against disruption of domestic peace, harmony, and tranquillity.8 2
This result is reached irrespective of the nature of the conduct, whether
it is intentional, wilful or wanton (such as assault and battery, ma-
licious prosecution, false imprisonment, libel and slander) or negligent
(almost always situations such as automobile injury cases where lia-
bility insurance would compensate if there were liability), and irre-
spective of whether the action is brought after separation, divorce or
death. Sometimes additional reasons are given in support of this re-
sult such as the possibility of opening a Pandora's box of litigation
and the danger of plundering estates or of interspousal collusion. A
leading case has been that of Thompson v. Thompson"5 which involved
assault and battery and was decided under a District of Columbia
statute which empowered married women "to sue separately" for torts
committed against them. The domestic harmony objection voiced
in that case has been applied in cases where the statutes were not
so restrictively worded. 4
81. ". . . [A] legislative intention to modify this ancient common-law concept of
the oneness of the spouses cannot rest upon doubtful implication". Kennedy v. Kamp,
14 N.J. 390, 102 A.2d 595 (1954).
"It [marital immunity] is as much a part of our law as if it were statutory
and cannot now be repudiated by the judiciary". American Auto Ins. Co. v. Molting,
239 Minn. 74, 57 N.W.2d 847 (1953).
82. Brown v. Gosser, 262 S.W.2d 480 (Ky. 1953) (42 Ky. L.J. 497; 32 TExAs
L. REv. 884): "The common law rule was originally based upon the historical fiction
of the unity of husband and wife, plus the inability of a person to sue himself. But
this concept has been abrogated by the enactment of women's emancipation statutes.
Since then courts have seized upon other theories to deny the right. The principal
one perhaps is that to permit suits for torts between husband and wife would be
to disturb domestic tranquillity and conjugal bliss .... "
83. 218 U.S. 611 (1910). Harlan, J., with whohn concurred Holmes and Hughes,
JJ., delivered a dissenting opinion.
84. Welch v. Davis, 342 Ill. App. 69, 95 N.E.2d 108 (1950) (22 Miss, L.J. 256);
Willott v. Willott, 333 Mo. 896, 62 S.W.2d 1084 (1933) ; Comstock v. Comstock,
106 Vt. 50, 169 Atl. 903 (1934); McKinney v. McKinney, 59 Wyo. 204, 135 P.2d
940 (1943) (9 U. DET. L.J. 16).
See also Cubbison v. Cubbison, 73 Cal. App. 2d 436, 166 P.2d 387 (1946);
Shiver v. Sessions, 80 So. 2d 905 (Fla. 1955); Carmichael v. Carmichael, 53 Ga.
App. 663, 187 S.E. 116 (1936); Sink v. Sink, 172 Kan. 217, 239 P.2d 933 (1952);
Burke v. Mass. Bonding & Ins. Co., 209 La. 495, 24 So. 2d 875 (1946) ; Harvey v.
New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 6 So. 2d 774 (La. App. 1942) ; Lubowitz v. Gaines,
293 Mass. 39, 198 N.E. 320 (1936) ; Kircher v. Kircher, 288 Mich. 669, 286 N.W.
120 (1939); American Auto. Ins. Co. v. Molling, 239 Minn. 74, 57 N.W.2d 847(1953); Romero v. Romero, 58 N.M. 20, 269 P.2d 748 (1954) ; Apitz v. Dames,
205 Ore. 242, 287 P.2d 585 (1955) ; Smith v. Smith, 205 Ore. 286, 287 P.2d 572
(1955) ; Serrano v. Gonzalez, 68 P.R. 579 (1948) ; Furey v. Furey, 193 Va. 727,
71 S.E.2d 191 (1952) ; Poling v. Poling, 116 W. Va. 187, 179 S.E. 604 (1935).
See further Bissonnette v. Bissonnette, 20 Conn. Super. 403, 137 A.2d 354 (1957),
aff'd, 142 A.2d 527 (Conn. 1958) (applying Massachusetts law) ; Esminger v.
Esminger, 222 Miss. 799, 77 So. 2d 308 (1954) ; Hansen v. Hansen, 274 Wis. 262,
80 N.W.2d 230 (1956) (applying Missouri law) ; Garlin v. Garlin, 260 Wis. 187,
50 N.W.2d 373 (1951) (applying Illinois law).
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In Sink v. Sink,85 express approval was given to the policy against
allowing personal tort actions between husband and wife, and in Vigi-
lant Insurance Co. v. Bennett,86 approval was given to the distinction
between allowing actions for property torts and not allowing actions
for personal torts.
A substantial minority of courts, however, have allowed personal
injury actions between spouses.8 7 Unless the statute expressly or by
necessary implication precludes them, interspousal actions will lie."8
A leading case has been that of Brown v. Brown,89 an action by
a wife against her husband for damages for assault and battery and
false imprisonment. The court construed the Connecticut Married
Women's Act broadly as changing the foundation of the legal status
of husband and wife, and, the statute not having modified the civil
rights that accord with the status founded upon separate legal identi-
ties, the rights of the spouses are the same as before marriage, except
the reciprocal rights and obligations inherent in the marital relation.
In the fact that the wife has a cause of action against her husband
for personal injuries the court saw nothing "injurious to the public,
or against the public good, or against good morals." "The danger
-that the domestic traquillity may be disturbed" and "courts will be
filled with actions" the court thought "not serious." The same result
was'reached in Bushnell v. Bushnell" where the action was for
negligence.
Again in allowing such actions no distinctions are usually made
between intentional91 and negligent conduct or whether the action is
brought during marriage or after separation, divorce, or death. 2
85. 172 Kan. 217, 239 P.2d 933 (1952).
86. 197 Va. 216, 89 S.E.2d 69 (1955) (42 VA. L. Rrv. 119).
87. Leach v. Leach, 300 S.W.2d 15 (Ark. 1957) (7 CAT!HOLIC U.L. Riv. 59; 23
Mo. L. Rgv. 103; 34 N.D.L. Riv. 71; 11 VAND. L. Rv. 618) refers to the majority.
view as dwindling.
88. To allow the action broad provisions in statutes and even very general
rights/remedies provisions in constitutions have been at times relied on. See Damm
v. Elyria Lodge, 158 Ohio St. 107, 107 N.E.2d 337 (1952) (32 B.U.L. Rev. 467;
14 OHIO ST. L.J. 331; 22 U. CINC. L. Rev. 122).
.89. 88 Conn. 42, 89 Atl. 889 (1914) (23 YALF L.J. 613).
90. 103 Conn. 583, 131 At. 432 (1925) (24 MICH. L. Riv. 618; 10 MINN. L.
Rev. 439).
91. "A strong minority of the more recent cases hold in favor of recovery by
a wife for intentional injuries inflicted by the husband, the opinions in which cases
are very persuasive." Damm v. Elyria Lodge, 158 Ohio St. 107, 107 N.E.2d 337(1952) (32 B.U.L. Rev. 467; 14 OHIo ST. L.J. 331; 22 U, CiNc. L. Rzv. 122).
92. Brown v. Gosser, 262 S.W.2d 480 (Ky. 1953) (42 Ky. L.J. 497; 32 TtXAS
L. Rev. 884); Damm v. Elyria, 158 Ohio St. 107, 107 N.E. 2d 337 (1952) (32
B.U.L. Rgv. 467; 14 OHIO ST. L.J. 331; 22 U. CINC. L. Rxv. 122); Waterman v.
Waterman, 3 Pa. D. & C. 2d 126 (C.P. Lack. 1954); Jaeger v. Jaeger, 262 Wis.
14, 53 N.W.2d 740 (1952) (applying Arizona law).
See also Langley v. Schumacker, 46 Cal. App. 607, 297 P.2d 977 (1956) ; Rains
v. Rains, 97 Colo. 19, 46 P.2d 740 (1935) ; Lorang v. Hays, 69 Idaho 440, 209 P.2d
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In some states that have generally denied the action there has
been more recently a tendency to question the soundness of the ma-
jority rule as broadly applied."3 A few have overruled prior decisions.94
And some recent cases of first impression have joined the minority
view.
In Smith v. Smith,"5 under a statute vesting in the wife such civil
rights belonging to the husband which had not heretofore been granted
her by statute, it was held that spouses could not sue one another
for negligent tort injury. Speaking generally, however, the court said:
"It would seem that the effect of suit upon marital felicity must de-
pend upon the facts of the particular case. Action by a wife against
her husband may conceivably engender great bitterness where it is
based on an intentional wrong or where there is serious and bitter
disagreement as to the facts. It is not unusual that the credibility of
witnesses is questioned in damage cases." But "at least so far as
acts of negligence are concerned, courts and writers alike recognize
that there are areas of marital intimacy within which actions for neg-
ligence should not be allowed. . . Those areas are not and we think,
733 (1949); Kelley v. Williams, 94 Mont. 425, 15 P.2d 922 (1932); Courtney v.
Courtney, 184 Okla. 395, 87 P.2d 660 (1938); Taylor v. Patten, 2 Utah 2d 404,
275 P. 2d 696 (1954); Nelson v. American Employers' Ins. Co., 258 Wis. 252, 45
N. W. 2d 681 (1951). See further Bennett v. Bennett, 224 Ala. 335, 140 So. 378
(1932) ; Katzenberg v. Katzenberg, 183 Ark. 626, 37 S.W.2d 696 (1931) (12 B.U.L.
Rnv. 134, 10 TEXAS L. REv. 242) ; Ginsberg v. Ginsberg, 126 Conn. 146, 9 A.2d 812
(1939).
"Our consideration of the question convinces us that the minority rule is more
in keeping with modern thought and the later cases on the subject." Brown v.
Gosser, 262 S.W.2d 480 (Ky. 1953) (42 Ky. L.J. 497; 32 TEXAS L. REv. 884).
93. ". . . [T]hat a wife is given the right to sue her husband for a broken
promise involving property, and for a wrecked house belonging to her, but not
for a broken arm nor a broken body" was characterized as appearing to be "a glar-
ing inconsistency" of the law. "To make such a distinction renders the person of
the wife in a marriage completely subjugated to the will of her husband, as far as
civil liability is concerned, for willful and wanton injuries, and . . . such injuries
are of no concern or value when placed in the scales of justice alongside property
rights. This seems to be inconsistent, inhumane, and contrary to the true spirit
and intent of the acts passed for the emancipation of women in an enlightened
civilization. However . . . the remedy lies with the legislature." Hunter v. Liv-
ingston, 125 Ind. App. 422, 123 N.E.2d 912 (1955). See also Esminger v. Esminger,
77 So. 2d 308 (Miss. 1955).
"In the rare instances where the wife will sue her husband despite his objection
there is probably not much tranquillity to preserve . . . . In any event, it is difficult
to see how a personal injury action would disrupt tranquillity more than a property
or contract action which is admittedly maintainable." Jacobs, J., dissenting ,in
Koplik v. C.P. Trucking Corp., 27 N.J. 1, 141 A.2d 34 (1958).
94. Stare decisis and implied legislative acquiescence, in addition to the other
reasons, have at times been referred to as precluding change. See Furey v. Furey,
193 Va. 727, 71 S.E.2d 191 (38 VA. L. Rv. 973), where the court referred to the
fact that during the thirty-four years since it had been held in Keisters' Adm'r v.
Keisters' Ex'rs, 123 Va. 157, 96 S.E. 315 (1918), that an action would not lie for
assault because the statute did not confer substantive rights, the legislature had
amended the statute, but had not changed this rule.
95. 205 Ore. 286, 287 P.2d 572 (1955).
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cannot, be accurately defined. . . . [W]e are not disposed to carve
out the area within which actions for negligence should be allowed,
or that other area in which the intimacy of the family relationship
forbids recovery by the spouses."
In Apitz v. Dames,9" the same court held where a husband had
shot and killed his wife and had then killed himself that an action
would lie by the wife's administrator against the husband's adminis-
trator, under a statute requiring the case to be one where the deceased
could have maintained an action in his lifetime, the court saying
"could the wife have sued the husband for intentionally shooting her
if the result had not been fatal? If it be determined by judicial de-
cision that the wife could have sued her husband, then we recognize
that the same rule would apply [to a husband attacked by his wife],
for no statute has given to either husband or wife the right to bring
such an action, and at early common law neither could sue the other
for intentional tort. . . ." The court referred to their recent decision
97
holding that a minor child could sue his parent for wilful and wanton
injury, and after observing that "the same rule of public policy was
established at common law in both situations" continued: "By strong
analogy, the case also applies to husband and wife. We conclude that
our duty in the pending case is clear. We must hold that if the wife
had survived . . . she would have had a right of action against her
husband, or against his representative. It is the virtue of the common
law that as mores change, the law will also change. An old rule is
eroded and a new rule attaches to the body of the law by accretion.
The process is best accomplished by gradual change as justice may
require in the individual case." The court concluded: "We hold that
when a husband inflicts intentional harm upon the person of his wife,
the peace and harmony of the home has been so damaged that there
is no danger that it will be further impaired by the maintenance of
an action for damages and she may therefore maintain an action." 98
In Ennis v. Truhitte,99 the court referring to Apitz v. Dames said
"there is, at least in certain types of cases, a 'trend' against the common-
96. 205 Ore. 242, 287 P.2d 585 (1955).
97. Cowgill v. Boock, 189 Ore. 282, 218 P.2d 445 (1950).
98. The distinction between wilful and negligent acts was disapproved in Tallios
v. Tallios, 345 Ill. App. 387, 103 N.E.2d 507 (1952). Tranquillity policy precludes
action without distinction. 40 ILL. B.J. 583 (1952-53) ; 24 Miss. L.J. 250 (1951-52).
See also Sullivan v. Sessions, 88 So.2d 706 (Fla. 1955) ; Gremillion v. Caffey, 71
So.2d 670 (La. App. 1954). But see Ennis v. Truhitte, 306 S.W.2d 549 (Mo. 1957) ;
Apitz v. Dames, 61 Ore. Adv. 31, 287 P.2d 585 (1955); Smith v. Smith, 61 Ore.
Adv. 3, 287 P.2d 572 (1955); Johnson v. Ottomeier, 45 Wash. 419, 275 P.2d 723
(1954).
99. 306 S.W.2d 549 (Mo. 1957).
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law rule [of no action]" and that that case "demonstrates plainly
enough the soundness of the trend." "In one sense, of course, if one
spouse may not sue the other there is no enforceable cause of action,
but it belies reality and fact to say that there is no tort when the
husband either intentionally or negligently injures his wife." Although
the married women's acts do not "either expressly deny or expressly
grant to a wife the right to sue her husband.., it is now recognized that
the terminology of the statutes is broad enough to permissively cover
the matter." Two judges dissented in the holding that a wife may
sue the estate of her deceased husband for alleged wilful, wanton and
intentional injury (in the operation of an automobile). The majority
was of the opinion that the husband being dead, the policy reasons
of preserving domestic harmony upon which denial of the action is
based had vanished. The minority thought the change so far reach-
ing that it should come from the legislature.
In Taylor v. Patten... it was held under a statute neutrally worded,
two justices dissenting, that a wife assaulted by her husband after a
divorce decree nisi becomes final can maintain an action in tort. The
court reasoned that the husband's rights to his wife's property and
the procedural requirement of joinder were the reasons at common
law against suit, that these had been abolished, and that no specific
statutory authorization was necessary. But the "special license" (in
marital and domestic conduct) should continue to prevent many suits.
The holding is perhaps limited to intentional tortious injury. A con-
curring opinion would limit it to conduct after a nisi decree.
In Brown v. Gosser'01 the court, overruling prior decisions, held
under a neutrally worded statute that a wife may maintain an action
against her husband for injuries negligently caused (operation of
automobile). After observing that some of the courts professing ad-
herence to the common-law rule have departed from it "upon any
plausible excuse" and that the common-law rule of no action had been
maintained in Kentucky "to promote domestic peace and felicity" the
court said: "The argument would have a truer ring except that a wife
may now sue her husband for tort affecting her property interest. ...
It is difficult to see how an action for personal injuries would disrupt
domestic peace and tranquillity more than an action for damage to
property. But, whether this is so or not . .. the Legislature .. .has
100. 2 Utah 2d 404, 275 P.2d 696 (1954) (8 ALA. L. Rv. 142; 18 U. DST. L.J.
444; 24 J.B.A. KAN. 194; 53 MICH. L. Rsv. 1192; 4 UTAH L. Rzv. 405).
101. 262 S.W.2d 480 (Ky. 1953) (42 Ky. L. J. 497; 32 Tx. L. REv. 884).
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enunciated the public policy on this subject in this state by saying a
married woman may sue and be sued as a single woman."
In Damm v. Elyria Lodge,' a case of first impression in Ohio,
it was held generally that a wife can maintain an action against her
husband for negligent injury (the husband had not caused the injury
but was a member of an unincorporated association at whose social
gathering the wife had been injured by a portable screen). After re-
ferring to the Ohio married women's statute (whose wording was
neutral) the court observed "no statute expressly prohibits actions
by a wife to recover damages from her husband for personal injuries
inflicted upon her by him" and that "a complete change of policy is
unmistakable and should not be disregarded." 103
In Brandt v. Keller"0 4 it was held that a wife can maintain an
action against her husband for negligent injury. The Illinois statute
provided that "a married woman may, in all cases, sue and be sued
without joining her husband with her, to the same extent as if she
were unmarried." Earlier statutes not containing the words "in all
cases" had been construed to permit a wife to sue her husband where
it was necessary to protect her own property but not to institute any
other type of action against him. The court reasoned that "it may
be assumed, therefore, to expand the rights of a married woman to
sue and be sued ...It is logical, therefore, that if a married woman
can assert contract rights against her husband without any specific
statutory mandate other than the foregoing provision allowing her
to sue 'in all cases,' she should be able to assert tort rights against
her husband under that same general provision. The statute cannot
be construed to abrogate a husband's common-law immunity from
suit by his wife for contract purposes, and be construed to perpetuate
his immunity for another purpose." The court referred to the fallacy
of the public policy rationale of "domestic tranquillity" saying "while
courts verbalize about statutory construction, they frequently retreat
under the protection of the nebulous concept 'public policy' . . . while
at the same time giving approbation to criminal proceedings instituted
by spouses against each other, and to actions on contracts or property
rights between spouses."
Following the decision in the Brandt case Illinois enacted a statute
providing that neither husband nor wife may sue the other for a tort
102. 158 Ohio St. 107, 107 N.E.2d 337 (1952).
103. The injury here, however, not only was not caused by an act of the husband
but did not arise out of conduct of the domestic establishment.
104. 413 Ill. 503, 109 N.E.2d 729 (1952) (2 Di: PAUL L. Riv. 285; 41 ILL. B. J.
283; 48 Nw. U. L. Rev. 75).
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to the person committed during coverture.0 5 This is the only instance,
it is believed, of an American statute that in express terms bars such
actions.
In Leach v. Leach,l"' it was held that a husband has a cause of
action against his wife for negligent injury. The court re-affirmed
its earlier decisions allowing a wife to sue her husband for either in-
tentional or negligent injury. "By a dwindling majority which now
stands at about two to one the American courts hold that she cannot
maintain the action .... The courts following the majority view con-
strue the emancipation acts strictly, as being in derogation of the
common law, and usually suggest that recognition of suits between
spouses would adversely affect harmony within the home. . . . This
reasoning has never appealed to us." As to action by a husband the
court reasoned: "This clause [in the married women's act that she
may sue and be sued] was the basis for our holding that a wife may
sue her husband in tort. There can be no sound basis for a different
conclusion when the shoe is on the other foot, for in the same breath
the legislature abolished her disability to sue and her immunity from
being sued." 107 Two justices dissenting expressed the opinion that
the earlier decision allowing action by a wife for negligent injury
should be overruled, but not the decision allowing action by her for
intentional injury.
In North Carolina, although it was held that a wife could main-
tain an action against her husband for personal injury tort, the hus-
band could not maintain such action against his wife.' Subsequently
a statute was enacted expressly allowing either to have an action
against the other." 9
In Wisconsin, in dealing with the same situation,"0 a statute'.'
was enacted expressly allowing husbands to bring personal injury-
actions against their wives. Since the court had already held112 that a
wife could maintain such action, her action was not included.
105. See ILL. Rev. STAT. ch. 68, § 1 (1953). See also Hindman v. Holmes, 124
N.E.2d 344 (Ill. App. 1955) (33 Ciii.-K NT L. Rev. 378) (not retroactive).
106. 300 S.W.2d 15 (Ark. 1957) (7 CATHOLIC U. L. REv. 59; 23 Mo. L. REv.
103; 34 NOTRv DAmg LAW. 71; 11 VAND. L. REv. 618).
107. But see Aldrich v. Tracy, 222 Iowa 84, 269 N.W. 30 (1936); Poling v.
Poling, 116 W. Va. 187, 179 S.E. 604 (1935) (4 FORDHAM L. Riv. 475; 41 W. VA.
L. Q. 429).
108. Scholtens v. Scholtens, 230 N.C. 146, 52 S.E. 2d 350 (1949) (28 N.C.L.
Rgv. 109).
109. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-10.1 (Supp. 1953).
110. Fehr. v. General Acc., Fire & Life Assur. Corp., 246 Wis. 228, 16 N.W.2d
787 (1944) (1945 Wis. L. REv. 463).
111. WIs. STAT. § 246.075 (1931).
112. Wait v. Pierce, 191 Wis. 202, 209 N.W. 745, aff'd on rehearing, 210 N.W.
822 (1926).
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New York, after the courts had repeatedly held that a wife could
not maintain an action against her husband for a personal injury
tort, enacted a statute expressly providing that either husband or wife
has a right of action against the other for wrongful or tortious acts
resulting in injury to person or property." 3
Where the defendant spouse has died after the conduct complained
of, a few cases have allowed an action for personal injury tort for
the reason that although the action could not have been maintained if
the defendant had not died the policy of preservation of domestic
harmony and tranquillity no longer operates to bar.. or that the bar
of unity has been removed."' When the injury has resulted in death
of the plaintiff the wrongful death statute may be of the type that
creates a cause of action not dependent upon whether deceased would
have had an action if death had not occurred."' If the statute is a
survival statute or creates a cause of action in terms of decedent's own
right of action, denying a right of action to an injured spouse would
logically result in denying recovery.'" In intentional injuries some
cases have permitted recovery, reasoning that the action could be main-
tained during coverture for intentional harm at least, or, if not, that
the policy reason of preserving domestic harmony has ceased."' If
the death of the defendant is the sole reason for allowing the action
because there is no home thereafter to preserve, the same reason would
113. N.Y. Laws, 1937, c. 669, added to § 57 of the Domestic Relation Law;
"A married woman has a right of action against her husband for his wrongful or
tortious acts resulting to her in any personal injury as defined in section thirty-seven-a
of the general construction law, or resulting in injury to her property, as if they
were unmarried, and she is liable to her husband for her wrongful or tortious acts
resulting in any such personal injury to her husband or to his property, as if they
were unmarried." See Risikoff v. Risikoff, 120 N.Y.S.2d 776 (Sup. Ct. 1953), aff'd
mer., 283 App. Div. 732, 127 N.Y.S.2d 522 (Sup. Ct. 1954) (not retroactive).
It also amended the insurance law to deal specially with the matter of liability
insurance. See note 161 infra.
114. Johnson v. People's First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 145 A.2d 716 (Pa. 1958);
Brower v. Webb, 5 D. & C. 2d 193 (C.P. Phila. 1955) ; Bodner v. Herley, 47 Berks
31 (C.P. Pa. 1954).
• .. [T]he wife's disability to sue is personal to herself, and does not inhere
in the tort itself . . . . [Her] personal disability necessarily disappears with death."
Johnson v. Ottomeier, 45 Wash. 2d 419, 275 P.2d 723 (1954). But see Welch v.
Davis, 410 Ill. 130, 101 N.E.2d 547 (1951).
115. Franklin v. Wills, 217 F.2d 899 (6th Cir. 1954) (23 TtNN. L. Rzv. 1056).
116. Glasco v. Glasco, 195 W. Va. 239, 77 S.E.2d 843 (1953) ; Morgan v. Lueck,
137 W. Va. 546, 72 S.E.2d 825 (1952).
117. Levlock v. Spanos, 131 A.2d 319 (N.H. 1957) (Vermont law). See also
Shiver v. Sessions, 80 So. 2d 905 (Fla. 1955) ; Sullivan v. Sessions, 80 So. 2d 706
(Fla. 1955).
118. Kaczorowski v. Kalkosinski, 321 Pa. 438, 184 Atd. 663 (1936) (50 HARv.
L. Rev. 131; 31 ILL. L. l4v. 796; 35 MICH. L. Riv. 508; 11 TeMP. L. Q. 108; 85
U. PA. L. Rxv. 124). See also Albrecht v. Potthoff, 192 Minn. 557, 257 N.W. 377
(1934) (35 COLUM. L. REv. 781; 48 HARV. L. Rev. 489; 19 MINN. L. Rnv. 595; 83
U. PA. L. Rgv. 688; 21 VA. L. Riv. 578).
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logically apply to divorce."19 Here, however, another public policy
should be considered, if an action will not lie during coverture, i.e.,
whether divorce might thereby be encouraged, particularly in negli-
gent injury cases where damages may be large, and the negligent spouse
insured against liability.
III.
In Gottliffe v. Edelston 2° an action was brought by a wife against
her husband for injuries suffered from the defendant's negligent oper-
ation of a motor car prior to the marriage. The Married Women's
Property Act, 1882,121 providing that a married woman shall continue
to hold as her separate property all real and personal property belong-
ing to her at the time of marriage, further defined "property" as in-
cluding choses in action. 122 No action would have existed if the in-
jury had occurred during coverture, for the statute provided that
with the exception of civil remedies for the protection and security of
a married woman's property no husband or wife shall be entitled to
sue the other for a tort. It was held that the action could not be main-
tained, since the meaning of choses in action does not include a tort
claim for personal injuries, and moreover the social purpose of the
statute in prohibiting such actions for injuries occurring during cover-
ture would apply equally to antenuptial torts.
This decision was expressly overruled some eighteen years later
by the Court of Appeal in Curtis v. Wilcox.23 which held that ante-
119. See also Gremillion v. Caffey, 71 So. 2d 670 (La.- App. 1954); Candidi v.
Candidi, 87 Pa. D. & C. 96 (C.P. Phila. 1953) (desertion statute).
Where there is no liability for personal injury torts it is generally held that
no action will lie after divorce: Wallach v. Wallach, 94 Ga. App. 576, 95 S.E.2d
750 (1956).
In Callow v. Thomas, 322 Mass. 550, 78 N.E.2d 637 (1948) (26 CHI.-KENT
L. Rtv. 352; 48 COLUm. L. Rgv. 961; 33 MINN. L. Rzv. 199; 28 NEB. L. REv. 625)
it was held that a tort action for personal injury committed during a voidable
marriage as distinguished from a void one could not be maintained after annulment,
since "no cause of action arises in favor of either husband or wife for a tort com-
mitted by the other during coverture" and the effect of avoidance, even though it
could be considered as relating back for purposes of the non-existence of the status,
would not make actionable an injury that was not actionable when it occurred.
But where the purported marriage is void ab initio, as where it is bigamous,
"the established rule relating to spouses of a valid marriage has no application."
Watson v. Watson, 240 P.2d 1005 (Calif. 1952) ; 246 P.2d 19. See also Langley v.
Schumacker, 46 Cal. App. 607, 283 P.2d 343 (1955). The effect of the distinction
between void and voidable seems to be admitted in the Callow case.
120. [1930] 2 K.B. 378 (4 CAMB. L.J. 222; 8 CAN. B. Rtv. 531; 31 CoLum. L.
REv. 323; 26 ILL. L. REV. 88; 47 L.Q. Rtv. 163; 37 W. VA. L. REv. 224).
121. 45 & 46 Vict., c. 75.
122. 45 & 46 Vict., c. 75, § 24.
123. [1948] 2 K.B. 474 (C.A.) (10 CAMB. L.J. 271; 26 CAN. B. REv. 1486; 83
IR. L.T. 41; 12 MODERN L. REv. 93, 24 N.Z.L.J. 263),.
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nuptial personal injury tort claims are within the meaning of "choses
in action" included in the term property in the Act of 1882, and that
a. married woman can maintain an action against her husband for
such injury, although such would still not be the case for personal
injuries occurring during marriage.
In Baylis v. Blackwell.. 4 it was held, however, that a husband
cannot maintain an action against his wife for an antenuptial personal
tort. Such action is possible only by provision of the Act of 1882
which was confined in this respect to property actions by a married
woman. This distinction the court recognized as possibly anomalous125
and indicated that the denial of causes of action for personal torts
during coverture might also, because of changing times, be anomalous
but it is "so firmly engrafted in our law that it can only rightly be
removed by legislation." In so far as it is based on public policy such
policy may change but "it is difficult to see why it [civil litigation be-
tween spouses] should be considered seemly today" if it was unseemly
in the 1880's.
In states that recognize interspousal personal injury tort actions
for conduct during marriage, actions for antenuptial torts would of
course be recognized.' 26 But in states that do not recognize actions
for conduct during coverture the almost unanimous view has been that
an action for an antenuptial tort will not lie.
In Newton v. Weber.2 it was held that the antenuptial action
abates. In Furey v. Furey2 " it was said that the right of action was
substantively extinguished. In Lubowitz v. Taines '2 it was also said
that a right of action for an antenuptial personal tort is not property.
In Koplik v. C. P. Trucking Corp.,' it was held that where the
parties married while an action was pending for injuries suffered from
124. [1952] 1 ALL. E.R. 74.
125. See also Gottliffe v. Edelston, [1930] 2 K.B. 378, where it was said:
"Though the wife can sue the husband for antenuptial debts, yet the husband has
no right whatsoever to sue the wife for the debts she owed to him before marriage.
Such is the astonishing state of the law."
126. Brown v. Gosser, 262 S.W.2d 480 (Ky. 1959) (42 Ky. L.J. 497; 32 TEXAS
L. Rev. 884) ; Shirley v. Ayers, 201 N.C. 51, 158 S.E. 840 (1931). See 3 U.C.L.A.L.
Rev. 371 (1956) ; Clement v. Atlantic Cas. Ins. Co., 13 N.J. 439, 100 A.2d 273 (1953)
(applying New York law) ; Stonborough v. Preferred Acc. Ins. Co., 292 N.Y. 154,
54 N.E.2d 342 (1944).
127. 119 Misc. 240,196 N.Y. Supp. 113 (1922) (36 HARV. L. Rev. 346; 32 YALE
L.J. 196).
See also Webster v. Snyder, 103 Fla. 1131, 138 So. 755 (1932) (10 U. PA. L.
Rev. 1027).
128. 193 Va. 727, 71 S.E.2d 191 (1952).
129. 293 Mass. 39, 198 N.E. 320 (1936). See also Wolfer v. Gehlers, 8 N.J.
Super. 434, 73 A.2d 95 (1950) (5 RUTGIERS L. Rev. 237).
130. 47 N.J. Super. 196, 135 A.2d 555 (1957) (10 ALA. L. Rev. 453; 60 VA. L.
Rev. 294).
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alleged negligent operation of an automobile the action did not abate.
This seems to be the only American recognition of the view of Curtis
v. Wilcox that an antenuptial personal injury tort claim is property
within the term "chose in action." Moreover the court reasoned that
identity of husband and wife is no longer the bar, but rather policy
against disturbing domestic tranquillity, and that "if the pendency
of such an action was no obstacle to the deliberate entry of the parties
into the marital relationship itself in the first instance, we see no
rational basis for the entertainment of a presumption that the continued
prosecution of the action, patently contemplated when the parties
married, will be substantially deleterious to that relationship." The
decision was, however, reversed,13' three judges dissenting, on the
ground that the New Jersey statute provided that a husband or wife
could not sue each other "except as heretofore, and except as author-
ized in this chapter" and nothing was contained therein to authorize
it. "It would be an illogical interpretation to declare that a wife is
not a wife, or suing as a wife, within its meaning, because her action
is predicated upon an antenuptial tort." 132 The court held that the
action abates.' 33
In Hamilton v. Fulkerson 34 it was held that an action could be
maintained by a wife for an antenuptial negligent personal injury tort,
the statute providing "any personal property, including rights in action,
belonging to any woman at the time of marriage . . . shall be and re-
main her separate property" and she "may in her own name and with-
out joining her husband as a party plaintiff institute and maintain
any action ... with the same force and effect as if such married woman
was a feme sole." After holding that "rights in action" included any
131. Koplik v. C. P. Trucking Corp., 27 N.J. 1, 141 A.2d 34 (1958).
132. Id., 141 A.2d at 39.
133. That an action cannot be maintained by one spouse against the other for
an antenuptial personal injury tort, see Baker v. Gaffney, 141 F. Supp. 602 (D.C.
1956) ; Bohenck v. Niedzwiecki, 142 Conn. 278, 113 A.2d 509 (1955) (8 BAYLOR L.
REv. 350) (applying Pennsylvania law); Hunter v. Livingston, 125 Ind. App. 422,
123 N.E.2d 912 (1955); Furey v. Furey, 193 Va. 727, 71 S.E.2d 191 (1952) (38
VA. L. REv. 973) ; see also Koenigs v. Travis, 246 Minn. 466, 75 N.W.2d 478 (1956) ;
Pryor v. Merchants Mut. Cas. Co., 174 N.Y.S.2d 24 (1958) (applying Pennsylvania
law).
See also Spector v. Weisman, 40 F.2d 792 (1930) (9 N.C.L. REv. 89) ; -Car-
michael v. Carmichael, 53 Ga. App. 633, 187 S.E. 116 (1936) ; Patenaude v. Patenaude,
195 Minn. 523, 263 N.W. 546 (1935) (20 MINN. L. REv. 227, 10 TEMP. L.Q. 328);
Scales v. Scales, 168 Miss. 439, 151 So. 551 (1934) ; Coster v. Coster, 289 N.Y. 488,
46 N.E.2d 509 (1943) (12 FORDHAM L. REv. 182) (applying Massachusetts law);
Raines v. Mercer, 165 Tenn. 415, 55 S.W.2d 263 (1932) ; Staats v. Co-operative
Transit Co., 125 W. Va. 473, 480, 24 S.E.2d 916 (1943).
134. 285 S.W.2d 642, 646 (Mo. 1955).
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cause of action, the court dealt with the matter of public policy and
expressed itself as being unconvinced "that there are any logical rea-
sons based upon considerations of public policy which should extend
the spousal disability to actions for personal torts which occurred prior
to marriage. . . .It is not apparent to us that the maintenance of an
action by one spouse against the other for an antenuptial personal tort
would disrupt domestic tranquillity any more than do permitted actions
between spouses based on wrongful acts affecting their separate prop-
erty. And if the domestic tranquillity is to be disturbed, such is accom-
plished by the desire to recover as fully as by recovery." 135
IV.
If a spouse has a cause of action against the other spouse the
defendant spouse's employer would also be liable to the injured spouse
if the act of the employee was such as to subject the employer to
liability under the principle of respondeat superior. Is the employer
subject to liability, if no action can be maintained by the injured spouse
against the employee spouse?
In Maine v. Maine & Sons Co."3 6 it was held that the employer
was not liable: the freedom of the spouse "from liability does not rest
merely upon the lack of remedy" but "it arises out of the very rela-
tionship itself .... Unless the servant is liable, there can be no liability
on the part of the master. . . .Where there is no right of action [in
the wife against the husband for a wrongful or negligent personal in-
135. It is generally held that the law of the place of the injury determines
whether a tort cause of action is created. If no cause of action arises or if it has
been terminated by the law of its creation due to a cause inherent therein (as in
antenuptial torts) no action will lie elsewhere. Bohenck v. Niedzwiecki, 142 Conn.
278, 113 A.2d 509 (1955) (8 BAYLOR L. Rev. 350) Coster v. Coster, 289 N.Y. 438,
46 N.E.2d 590 (1943) (12 FORDHAm L. Rev. 182); Buckeye v. Buckeye, 203 Wis.
248, 234 N.W. 342 (1931) (31 COLUM. L. Rxv. 884; 44 HARV. L. Rtv. 1138; 29 MICH.
L. REv. 937; 79 U. PA. L. Rev. 804; 6 Wis. L. REv. 103). See Miltimore v. Milford
Motors Co., 89 N.H. 272, 197 Atil. 330 (1938) ; Gray v. Gray, 87 N.H. 82, 174 At.
508 (1934).
If a cause of action exists by the law of the place of its creation and action is
brought elsewhere where such action is not allowed, it is generally held that no
action can be maintained at the forum. Kircher v. Kircher, 288 Mich. 669, 286 N.W.
120 (1939) (MICH. ST. B.J. 141) ; Mertz v. Mertz, 271 N.Y. 466, 3 N.E.2d 597
(1936) (6 BROOKLYN L. Rgv. 100; 36 COLUM. L. Rtv. 1158; 5 FORDHAM L. Rtv.
496; 50 HARV. L. Rxv. 35; 14 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 93; 11 ST. JOHN's L. Rzv. 122; 10
U. CINc. L. Rev. 473); Poling v. Poling, 116 W. Va. 187, 179 S.E. 704 (1935)
(4 FORDHAm L. Rtv. 475, 41 W. VA. L. Rrv. 429).
But see Franklin v. Wills, 217 F.2d 899 (6th Cir. 1954) (23 TS NN. L. Rnv.
1056); Baker v. Gaffney, 141 F. Supp. 602 (D.D.C. 1956); Hansen v. Hansen, 274
Wis. 262, 80 N.W.2d 230 (1956); Scholle v. Home Mut. Cas. Co., 273 Wis. 387,
78 N.W.2d 902 (1956).
136. 198 Iowa 1278, 201 N.W. 20 (1924) (25 CoLUM. L. Riv. 377; 38 HARV.
L. REv. 824; 9 MINN. L. Rev. 485; 11 VA. L. Rev. 573; 3 Wis. L. Rtv. 188).
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jury inflicted by the husband] there can be no liability therefor on
his [the master's] part." 137
The contrary conclusion was reached in Schubert v. Schubert
Wagon Co.138 The court was of the opinion that only if the servant's
act was lawful is the master not liable under the rule of respondeat
superior; the spouse's disability having its origin in marital identity
does not make his act lawful which would otherwise be unlawful;
the spouse is exempt or has a personal immunity'39 from liability;
and the employer must answer for the damage whether he directly
commanded a trespass be committed or whether the trespass was in-
cidental to his business, for "in each case the maxim governs that he
who acts through another, acts by himself." True the master would
have a remedy over against the servant but this is not based on subro-
gation but is based on an independent duty owed by the servant to
the master to render faithful service. The court did not feel that
there was any conflict between liability of the employer to the injured
spouse and the servant's "exemption" from liability to his spouse.
But if one or the other must yield "the exemption would have to give
way as an exception, more or less anomalous, to a responsibility which
to-day must be accepted as a general rule," i.e., to the explicit provision
of the New York Domestic Relation Law as it then read that "a married
woman has a right of action for an injury to her person, property, or
character . ..as if unmarried." 140
The result reached in the Schubert case has been reached in a
number of cases in other American jurisdictions' 4' and in England.
In Broom v. Morgan42 husband and wife were both employed by a
137. See Sacknoff v. Sacknoff, 131 Me. 280, 161 Att. 669 (1932) (17 MINN.
L. REV. 480) ; Riegger v. Bruton Brewing Co., 178 Md. 518, 16 A.2d 99 (1944) (16
MD. L. REv. 173) ; Riser v. Riser, 240 Mich. 402, 215 N.W. 290 (1927) (76 U. PA.
L. REv. 324) ; Emerson v. Western Seed & Irrigation Co., 116 Neb. 180, 216 N.W.
297 (1927) (26 MICH. L. REv. 830; 6 NEB. L. Rev. 421).
See also Baker v. Gaffney, 141 F. Supp. 602 (D.D.C. 1956).
138. 249 N.Y. 253, 164 N.E. 42 (1928) (29 COLUM. L. REv. 222; 42 HARV. L.
REv. 697; 24 ILL. L. REv. 232; 27 MICH. L. REv. 830; 6 N.Y.U.L. Rnv. 53).
139. Treated as an immunity in § 217(2) of the Restatement of Agency; comment
(b) follows Schubert case.
140. See Tallios v. Tallios, 345 Ill. App. 387, 103 N.W.2d 507 (1952) (40
ILL. B.J. 583; 24 Miss. L.J. 250; U. ILL. L.F. 639) (distinguishing immunity from
privilege).
See also Jones v. Kinney, 113 F. Supp. 923 (W.D. Mo. 1953). Cf. Stitzinger v.
Stitzinger Lumber Co., 144 A.2d 486 (Pa. Super. 1958).
141. See Mi-Lady Cleaners v. McDaniel, 235 Ala. 469, 179 So. 908 (1938);
Mully v. Langinberg Bros. Grain Co., 339 Mo. 582, 98 S.W.2d 645 (1936).
Cf. Conley v. Conley, 92 Mont. 425, 15 P.2d 922 (1932) (husband not liable
to his wife for injuries due to husband's chauffeur's negligence).
142. [1953] 1 Q.B. 597 (C.A.). See 27 AuSTL. L.J. 323, 498, seemingly critical
of the case, in which it is said that the trend in the British Commonwealth cases
is in the direction of the result reached.
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third person (a woman) licensee of a public house, the husband as
manager and his wife as his helper, both to devote entire time to
the business and reside on the premises. The wife was injured when
she fell through a trap door that had been left open. After it was
concluded that there had been negligence under the circumstances, it
was held that the employer was liable to the wife. Singleton, L. J.,
thought there was no reason why the employer should have an "im-
munity" which springs from the "fiction" that husband and wife are
one and from "the desire that litigation between husband and wife
shall not be encouraged." Denning, L. J., considered the husband as
guilty of a tort and his lack of liability as an immunity which under
the Married Women's Act of 1882 is "a mere rule of procedure and
not a rule of substantive law" and that the master's liability was his
own notwithstanding the servant's immunity, but if this were not so
and if the master's liability were a vicarious one only he would still
be liable because the servant was doing his master's business, and
the master's duty was to see that it was properly done, he taking
the benefit when properly done should have the burden when not
properly done.
Hodson, L. J., did not agree that the disability was procedural
only but nevertheless thought that the language of section 12 of the
Married Women's Act "presupposes the existence of the tort" from
the consequences of which there was personal immunity, which im-
munity did not extend to a master vicariously liable.
It is to be noted that there might have been a liability here based
on the defendant's being an occupier of premises, or on her being the
employer of the injured person. Some of the reasoning seems referable
to those aspects rather than to respondeat superior.
In the decision of this case below 4 Goddard, C. J., said "the
master is just as much liable as though he commits the tort himself
because the servant's act is his act" and observed that "it appears
that since 1928 the American cases have [held the employer liable]
beginning with Schubert v. August Schubert Wagon Co."
In the Schubert case it was recognized that a master held liable
to the injured spouse of the employee under respondeat superior can
hold the employee liable for breach of duty to the master subjecting
the latter to loss. And in Broom v. Morgan, Goddard, C. J., remarked
that "I suppose that in this case, if the defendant [master] is liable,
143. Broom v. Morgan, [1952] 2 ALL. E.R. 1007.
25
McCurdy: Personal Injury Torts between Spouses
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1959
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
she [the master] will be able to bring an action (if it be worth her
while) against the husband whose negligence has caused her to pay
damages to his wife," and made reference to "authorities which say
that, in view of the master's right to look to the servant whose
acts have made him liable, such a suit would seem to be an indirect
action against a husband in favour of a wife who was barred from
the direct action." 144 This point was made in Maine v. Maine & Sons
as another reason for holding the defendant employer not liable to
the injured spouse. And in Jones v. Kinney'45 the husband's employer
when sued by the employee's wife brought in the husband in order to
recover over. The court regarded this as permissible since the master's
liability was based on principles of agency and his right against the
employee was predicated neither on subrogation nor on contribution
between joint tort-feasors but was a right to indemnity.
Even if the rule of respondeat superior rests on the reasons given
in the above cases it is apparent that if an employee spouse is discharged
by the employer or compelled to indemnify the employer that this be-
comes in fact an indirect liability and capable of resulting in just as
much disruption of domestic harmony as a direct liability would be
unless such disruption is thought to result only when the spouses are
direct adversary parties in litigation. If, however, both employer and
employee are covered by insurance, harmony may be enhanced, rather
than disrupted.
The principle of the Schubert case was applied in Silverman v.
Silverman146 to a situation where liability of the owner of an auto-
mobile was based on the family purpose doctrine, and in May v. Palm
Beach Chemical Corp.,47 to a situation where the owner's liability
was based on the operation with his consent of an automobile by the
husband of the injured plaintiff.
Where, however, a wife has been injured by the negligence of
her husband while he was engaged in partnership business she cannot
144. Ibid.
145. 113 F. Supp. 923 (W.D. Mo. 1953).
146. 145 A.2d 826 (Conn. 1958).
147. 77 So. 2d 468 (Fla. 1955).
See also Broaddis v. Wilkenson, 281 Ky. 601, 136 S.W.2d 1052 (1940); Miller
v. Tyrholm & Co., 196 Minn. 438, 265 N.W. 324 (1936) (20 MINN. L. R~v. 566; 21
IOWA L. R:v. 804; 4 U. CINc. L. Rev. 132) ; Riemers v. Clark, 300 N.Y. Supp. 31
(App. Div. 1937); Ackerman v. Kibler, 232 App. Div. 306, 249 N.Y. Supp. 629 (1931).
Cf. Webster v. Snyder, 103 Fla. 1131, 138 So. 755 (1932) (80 U. PA. L. Rvv.
1027) (antenuptial tort).
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maintain an action against the other partners if she cannot maintain
an action against the husband.14
Where two persons combine negligently as in an automobile col-
lision to injure the spouse of one of them and the injured person
may recover from the person not his or her spouse but may not main-
tain an action against the spouse, it has generally been held that there
can be no contribution from the latter to the other defendant, even
though otherwise a proper case for contribution. 4 9
V.
Many of the interspousal personal injury cases reaching appellate
courts have been cases of negligence rather than conduct such as vio-
lence or other intentional aggression; most of the negligence cases
arise out of the operation of automobiles, and perhaps in a high per-
centage of these cases the offending spouse has a policy of insurance
covering his liability. If the offending spouse is legally liable.. the
insurer would be liable to him, and under some policies in some situ-
ations subject to suit by the injured person,' unless the policy ex-
148. Fagg v. Benton Motor Co., 193 Tenn. 562, 246 S.W.2d 978 (1952).
But cf. Hary v. Arney, 145 N.E.2d 575 (Ind. App. 1957).
Cf. also Tobin v. Hoffman, 202 Md. 382, 96 A.2d 597 (1953).
See also David v. David, 161 Md. 532, 157 Atl. 755 (1932) ; Karalis v. Karalis,
213 Minn. 31, 41 N.W.2d 632 (1942) ; Caplan v. Caplan, 268 N.Y. 445, 198 N.E. 23
(1935) (5 BROOKLYN L. REv. 174; 36 COLUM. L. REv. 501; 21 CORNELL L.Q. 157;
5 FORDHAM L. REv. 186, 628; 21 Go. L.J. 484; 30 ILL. L. REv. 806; 13 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 310; 10 ST. JOHN'S L. Rgv. 137; 84 U. PA. L. REv. 429; 22 VA. L. REv. 473;
45 YALE L.J. 528).
Where a wife may maintain an action against her husband, see Jacobs v. United
States Fid. & Guar. Co., 152 N.Y.S.2d 128 (1956) ; Travelers Indem. Co. v. Unger,
158 N.Y.S.2d 892 (1956).
149. See Ferguson v. Davis, 42 Del. 299, 102 A.2d 707 (1954); Koenigs v.
Travis, 246 Minn. 466, 75 N.W.2d 478 (1956); American Auto Ins. Co. v. Molling,
239 Minn. 74, 57 N.W.2d 847 (1953); Kennedy v. Camp, 14 N.J. 390, 102 A.2d 595
(1954).
But see Kiser v. Schlosser, 389 Pa. 131, 132 A.2d 344 (1957) ; Negley v.
McKeehan, 7 Pa. D. & C. 2d 21 (C.P. Cumb. 1956) ; Wursted v. Lazarski, 27 North.
L.J. 1 (Pa. C.P. North 1954).
See also Yellow Cab. Co. v. Dreslin, 181 F.2d 626 (D.C. Cir. 1950) ; Steele
v. Steele, 65 F. Supp. 329 (D.D.C. 1946) (26 NEB. L. REv. 442) ; Koenigs v. Travis,
246 Minn. 466, 75 N.W.2d 478 (1956).
Cf. Ewald v. Lane, 104 F.2d 222 (D.C. Cir. 1939) (25 Cornell L.Q. 312; 27
GEo. L.J. 991; 38 Micii. L. Rgv. 745) ; Singer v. Singer, 245 Wis. 191, 14 N.W.2d 43
(1944) (28 MARQ. L. REv. 131).
150. Insurance may of course be of the type that covers an event and certain
losses resulting therefrom irrespective of fault, i.e., a policy referrable to accidents
in the legal sense of the term. An automobile liability policy often contains a medical
expenses or payments coverage and in terms includes members of the insured's family
injured through the operation of the automobile irrespective of legal liability.
151. It has been suggested that this feature may affect the liability of the insurer.
See Mesite v. Kirchstein, 145 Atl. 753 (Conn. 1929) ; Smith v. Morrison, 185 N.C.
577, 118 S.E. 12 (1923).
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cludes the particular risk." 2 If there is no legal liability on the part
of the insured, the policy does not cover. 53  It covers liability, does
not create it.'
In Tooth & Co., Ltd. v. Tillyer,'55 a married woman, who was
an employee of a third person, was, while in the course of employ-
ment and a passenger in an automobile operated by her husband, in-
jured through his negligent operation. She recovered workmen's com-
pensation from her employer, who in turn sought to recover from
the husband under a clause in the workmen's compensation statute
allowing the employer to recover from one legally liable for the injury
resulting in the employee's compensation. It was held that the em-
ployer could not recover, since the husband was not legally liable to
his wife, distinguishing the Broom and Schubert cases.
But in determining the question of whether interspousal personal
injury actions are to be allowed in negligence cases should the matter
of liability insurance be an important factor ?156 Here again irrespective
of the terminology of the married women's statutes some courts discuss
supposed policy. It would seem clear that the policy argument gen-
erally advanced that interspousal actions disrupt domestic harmony,
peace, and tranquillity is not persuasive. The danger is not domestic
discord, but the possibility of domestic collusion in presenting fraudu-
lent claims for insurers to pay. In Brandt v. Keller 5 it was said:
"Other courts stress the danger of collusion in tort actions between
spouses, and hold that consequently such actions are against public
policy .... However, the potentiality of collusion, or of the perversion
of the administration of justice exists in all litigation, and cannot
152. Kirk v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 289 S.W.2d 538 (Tenn. 1956)
(where insurance contract excluded the family of the insured).
Cf. Scholle v. Home Mut. Cas. Co., 273 Wis. 387, 78 N.W.2d 902 (1956) (the guest
statute involved did not give an action but was a restriction).
153. See Durham v. Durham, 227 Miss. 461, 85 So. 2d 807 (1956).
But see Addison v. Employers Mut. Liab. Co., 64 So. 2d 484 (La. App. 1953)
where it was held that a wife injured by her husband could recover from the in-
surer, although the insurance policy provided that the insurer would pay on behalf
of the insured all sums which the insured "shall become legally obligated to pay."
It was reasoned that a tort occurred and a cause of action arose against the insured,
but no right of action, because of the husband's "personal immunity." See also
McLain v. National Cas. Co., 28 So. 2d 680 (La. App. 1947).
154. Fehr v. General Acc. Fire & Life Assur. Corp., 246 Wis. 228, 16 N.W.2d
787 (1944) (1945 Wis. L. Rev. 463). Cf. Clement v. Atlantic Gas Ins. Co., 13 N.J.
439, 100 A.2d 273 (1953).
See Ford, Interspousal Liability for Automobile Accidents, 15 U. PITT. L. Rev.
397, 401 (1954); Streit, The Carrying of Liability Insurance as Creating Tort Lia-
bility, 1952 INs. LAW J. 602.
155. ARGUS L.R. 891 (Australia 1956).
156. See Esminger v. Esminger, 77 So. 2d 308 (Miss. 1955).
157. 413 Ill. 503, 109 N.E.2d 729 (1952) (2 Dn PAUL L. Rxv. 285; 41 ILL. B.J.
283; 48 Nw. U.L. Rev. 75).
[VOL. 4 : p. 303
28
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 3 [1959], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol4/iss3/1
SPRING 1959] PERSONAL INJURY TORTS BETWEEN SPOUSES 331
properly constitute legal grounds for construing a statute in an abortive
manner, nor be a determinative factor in construing rights. . . .Nor
does the fact that an insurance company may be the real defendant
in interest in such cases constitute a ground for barring the action.
In fact, this type of liability constitutes an additional risk which may
be insured against, and would ultimately redound to the benefit of
the insurer, rather than against its interest. .. ."
And in Brown v. Gosser:158 "the fear that relaxation of the com-
mon-law rule will open the door to fraudulent and fictitious claims,
especially against insurance companies, has less force than the argu-
ment of 'domestic peace and felicity.' We are not willing to admit
that the courts are so ineffectual, nor our jury system so imperfect,
that fraudulent claims cannot be detected and disposed of accordingly.
"There is opportunity for fraud in many types of claims which
reach the courts, but that does not justify denying the right to main-
tain those which have merit. This same argument has been advanced
against most proposals for changes in our legal procedure, and espe-
cially in regard to the emancipation of women.
But in Smith v. Smith 0 these observations are countered: "The
minority rulings brush aside the risk of collusion by the husband and
wife by the simple assertion that the courts know how to deal with
collusive suits. But it is obvious that the risk of collusive action in-
creases when the parties plaintiff and defendant are in confidential
relationship. The risk of financial loss is ordinarily inducement enough
to encourage a sturdy defense. Remove from a defendant the risk
of loss and substitute the covert hope of profit and a situation arises
which should give us pause. . . . It would seem that if husband and
wife want protection by insurance, accident policies are available. We
do see a substantial risk of miscarriage of justice, when, in the peace
and harmony of conjugal bliss, a wife prepares a damage suit against
her husband over the solitary protest of an insurance company ... "
In 1937 the same New York statute that amended the Domestic
Relation Law to allow interspousal rights of action in tort also amended
the Insurance Law to provide that no liability insurance policy insured
158. 262 S.W.2d 840 (Ky. 1953) (42 Ky. L.J. 497; 32 TZXAS L. Rev. 884).
159. See dissenting opinion of Jacobs, J., in Koplik v. C. P. Trucking Corp., 27
N.J. 1, 141 A.2d 34, 42 (1958): ". . . [T]he husband, protected by insurance, may
welcome her action .... The fear of fraudulent actions, and collusive actions where
the husband is insured, furnishes equally tenuous basis for the majority view. There
is opportunity for fraud and collusion in many legal proceedings, but our system of
courts and juries is very well designed to seek them out and its presence clearly
furnishes no just or moral basis for precluding honest and meritorious actions."
160. 205 Ore. 286, 287 P.2d 872 (1955).
29
McCurdy: Personal Injury Torts between Spouses
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1959
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
against liability for injuries to person or property of an insured's
spouse unless expressly (later the word "specifically" was added) in-
cluded in the policy.'
In Fuchs v. London & Lancashire Indemnity Co.'"2 these simul-
taneous enactments were characterized as disclosing "a considered legis-
lative intent to create a right of action theretofore denied, and at the
same time to protect insurance carriers against loss through collusive
actions between husband and wife."
No New York case of express coverage has been found.' The
cases that have arisen have been concerned mainly with the applica-
tion of the statutes to injuries occurring in other states where inter-
spousal causes of action are also recognized and to the question of
who is an insured within the meaning of the statute.
The exclusion provision of the insurance law is not a part of the
domestic relations law and has no effect upon the creation or recog-
nition of the interspousal cause of action.' The terms of the New
161. N.Y. Laws, 1937, c. 669 at the same time amended N.Y. INS. LAWS 109-
a section added by Laws, 1917, c. 524, and thereafter amended-by inserting a new
subdivision 3a: "No such policy, however, heretofore or hereafter issued shall be
deemed to insure against any liability of an insured for injuries to his or her spouse
or for injury to property of his or her spouse, unless express provision for such
insurance is included in the policy." See also Laws, 1939, c. 882, § 167(3), which
added "or destruction of" before "property" and changed "express provision for
such insurance" to read "express provision relating specifically thereto"; as changed
in 1939 this was further changed in Laws, 1945, c. 409 to insert "death of or" be-
fore "injuries." In General Acc. Fire & Life Assur. Corp. v. Morgan, 33 F. Supp.
190 (W.D.N.Y. 1940), it was held before the amendment of 1945 that "injuries" did
not include "death" within the meaning of subdivision 3.
162. 171 Misc. 908, 14 N.Y.S.2d 387, aff'd, 17 N.Y.S.2d 338 (App. Div. 1940).
But see N.Y. LAW REVISION COMM'N. REPORT, RECOMMENDATIONS AND STUDIES, 65,
77 (1938). Reasons for the interspousal suits and insurance provision are not
stated. The Commission carried revision of this provision in its Proposals for
Future Consideration from 1937 through 1945 and 1948. It was not listed beginning
with the 1949 Report.
163. In Priddle v. Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 100 N.H. 73, 119 A.2d 97 (1955), a New
York automobile liability policy insuring against liability to any person (the injury
to the insured's wife caused by the insured occurring in New Hampshire, the parties
being residents of New York) contained a provision that anything in the policy in
conflict with the New York statute should be deemed to conform to the statute,
was held to cover the husband's liability for injury occurring outside New York
(although not if it had occurred in New York) since such an intention was mani-
fested. However, it is difficult to regard this as an express and specific inclusion
or reference.
164. The insurance exclusion does not apply to antenuptial injuries, since the
liability by virtue of the Domestic Relations Law becomes fixed at the time of the
accident. Stonborough v. Preferred Acc. Ins. Co., 292 N.Y. 154, 54 N.E.2d 342
(1944).
Cf. Pryor v. Merchants Mut., 12 Misc. 2d 801, 174 N.Y.S.2d 24 (Sup. Ct. 1958),
where antenuptial injury occurred in Pennsylvania (the parties being residents of
New York) and it was held that there could be no recovery, since by the law of
Pennsylvania there was no cause of action created for liability, despite the fact that
the New York Domestic Relations Law had been amended since the Coster case
decided before New York allowed an interspousal action.
Cf. also Maryland Cas. Co. v. Jacek, 156 F. Supp. 43 (D.N.J. 1957), where the
insurance policy was a New Jersey contract and the injury occurred in New York
[VoL. 4: p. 303
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York contract as affected by the Insurance Law are controlling 65 as
to the insurance contract only.
The exclusion of the Insurance Law is applicable not only to the
named insured whose spouse is injured but to any one else whose
spouse is injured if he is within the insurance contract's definition of
insured, whenever the insurer's liability is predicated on liability of
that person. 66 In the latter case the exclusion would not be applicable
to the named insured and consequently if the named insured is liable
his liability would be covered. And so an employer, if liable to the
employee's spouse, would be covered by the insurance contract." 7
The employee in such a case would not be covered against his liability
to his employer although not a liability to the spouse, for it is liability
resulting from operation of the automobile that is the subject of the
insurance contract, not liability of an employee to indemnify an em-
ployer.6 Where an action is against an owner of an automobile for
at a time when a liability arose under the law of New York. New Jersey would
not have created a cause of action if the injury had occurred in New Jersey, nor
permit suit by one spouse against the other if the injury occurred elsewhere. The
injured wife had obtained a judgment in New York. It was held that direct suit
by the wife against the insurer (in accordance with provisions of the New Jersey
contract) could be maintained on the contract to collect the judgment, the insurance
policy being governed by New Jersey law and not by that of New York. See also
Clement v. Atlantic Cas. Ins. Co., 13 N.J. 439, 100 A.2d 273 (1953).
165. New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Stecker, 3 N.Y.2d 1, 163 N.Y.S.2d 626 (Ct.
App. 1957), affirming, 1 App. Div. 2d 629, 152 N.Y.S.2d 879 (1956).
See also Globe Indem. Co. v. Anastasio, 158 N.Y.S.2d 641 (Sup. Ct. 1956);
General Acc. Fire & Life Assur. Corp. v. Ganser, 150 N.Y.S.2d 705 (Sup. Ct. 1956);
Lamb v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 5 Misc. 2d 236, 161 N.Y.S.2d 703 (Sup. Ct. 1941)
(unreported at that time) ; General Acc. Fire & Life Assur. Corp. v. Javian, 2 Misc.
2d 94, 152 N.Y.S.2d 345 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
Before these cases were decided a contrary view was taken in Williamson v.
Mass. Bonding & Ins. Co., 142 Conn. 573, 116 A.2d 169 (1955), on the ground that
although the interpretation of the New York insurance contract is governed by
the New York Insurance Law it was only intended to relate to the liability action
simultaneously created by the Domestic Relation Law and not to liability actions
allowed by the law of other states, particularly in the case of an injury in Connecticut
whose law had already for a long time allowed interspousal personal injury actions.
166. Lamb v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 5 Misc. 2d 236, 161 N.Y.S.2d 703 (Sup.
Ct. 1941).
167. Reis v. Economy Hotels and Restaurants Purveyors, Inc., 155 N.Y.S.2d 713
(Sup. Ct. 1956); Feinman v. Bernard Rice Sons, Inc., 133 N.Y.S.2d 639 (Sup. Ct.
1954), aff'd, 285 App. Div. 926, 139 N.Y.S.2d 884, appeal denied 309 N.Y. 750, 128
N.E. 760 (1955). Conversely if an employee tortiously injures his employer's spouse,
the employer if liable to the spouse would not be covered by the insurance but the
employee (if insured within the terms of the policy) would be so covered.
168. In Feinman v, Bernard Rice Sons, Inc., supra, it was held that, where the
employee's wife was injured through the negligence of her husband, the husband
cannot claim indemnity from the insurer against the employer's claim to indemnity
from the employee.
See to the same effect Reis v. Economy Hotels and Restaurants Purveyors, Inc.,
155 N.Y.S.2d 713 (Sup. Ct. 1956), holding that an employee who was impleaded
by his employer in an action by the employee's wife and who had brought in the
insurer could not recover.
See also Katz v. Wessel, 207 Misc. 456, 139 N.Y.S.2d 564 (Sup. Ct. 1955),
where it was said that collusive actions between husband and wife "are as much a
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injury caused by a borrower to the borrower's spouse, the insurer
is liable; but where the owner brings action against or resorts to
the borrower, the insurer is not liable to the borrower, although he
is within the policy's definition of insured (although not a named
insured), since for that reason he is excluded by the statute. 6" Where
the injured person is the husband or wife of a person who is a partner
with a third person the statutory exclusion does not operate to exclude
liability of that partner nor of the partnership, the insurer having
separate obligations to each partner.'
Does allowing interspousal personal injury actions lead to a
substantial number of claims and to abuse where such actions are
within liability insurance coverage and particularly where injury results
from operation of an automobile? It is clear that where there is
covering insurance an action will not involve any impairment of do-
mestic harmony, but is there a basis, sufficiently established empirically,
for applying a policy against "domestic collusion"?
In general insurers do not (according to information informally
gathered) have figures showing the number or amount of interspousal
automobile liability claims or their impact on general insurance lia-
bility losses, and no tables or computations isolate this factor and
analyze these claims, although at times large, and it would seem that
their rate effect is not regarded as being significant. Premium rates
are figured for risks in an area, and accidents although occurring
elsewhere are charged to the home area of the car involved. Factors
such as age of drivers and number of cars and accidents are susceptible
of statistical classification. Interspousal claims, even though they may
be substantial, are probably not susceptible of such classification. In
any particular state a comparison, if possible, between the situations
as they existed before and after a change in statute or decisions allow-
ing or prohibiting such causes of action would not be useful because
so many other factors affect the rate structure and rates have been
constantly rising. And so too of a comparison between states; some
states where interspousal actions are not allowed are the highest rate
areas. In states where they are allowed (standard policies do not ex-
possible evil where the husband is the employee-operator of the automobile as where
he is the employer-operator" and is within the exclusion purpose of the statute.
169. General Acc. Fire'& Life Assur. Corp. v. Katz, 150 N.Y.S.2d 667 (Sup.
Ct. 1956).
See Note, 6 BUFVALO L. Rev. 320 (1957) discussing the insurer's right of subro-
gation to the right of the owner, the named insured.
170. Traveler's Indemnity Co. v. Unger, 158 N.Y.S.2d 892 (Sup. Ct. 1956);
Jacobs v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 152 N.Y.S.2d 128 (1956) (public liability
store policy).
See Note, 8 SYRACUsp L. Rlv. 247 (1957) (the New York exclusion).
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dude) there are indications that they have increased, particularly in
more recent years, insurance motivating the action if the injury is
severe; and there is reason to believe there may be much fraudulent
collusion. Some insurers issuing non-standard policies do exclude
coverage against such liability.
Is there experience available in New York to show the effect of
the two statutes, the one allowing interspousal personal injury claims
but the other excluding liability of an insurer for such liability unless
expressly and specifically included, upon the number of such inclu-
sions, the number of such claims, and the matter of rates for the
special inclusion clause, or, if no separate premium is charged, the
effect on overall rates? In respect to automobile liability which would
seem to be the most important liability category and for which avail-
able information has been obtained, there has been no experience with
the effect of inclusion. Standard policies filed with the Insurance De-
partment do not contain any such inclusion and policies written in
New York containing such inclusion would have to be so filed. In
other words insurers do not insure against this category of liability.
It may be that this is due to a feeling that there is danger of collusion,
fraud and abuse, that such coverage could not be given without extra
charge, and that the setting of special premium rates would be im-
practicable.
Nevertheless, the New York statute itself is an interesting com-
promise in the matter of negligence liability. Express and specific
interspousal insurance policy coverage, if written, and if considered
a special risk category, should furnish comparative emperical data
with which to check a priori assumptions.
VI.
The majority of courts have held that neither husband nor wife
has a personal injury tort action against the other. A substantial
minority have allowed such action. Usually no distinction is made by
either view between intentional and careless conduct, nor between
antenuptial conduct and conduct that occurs during marriage, nor
between actions brought during marriage and those brought after its
termination. There has been some tendency, however, on the part
of courts whose general rule does not allow interspousal personal
injury actions to depart from it in cases of serious intentional and
wilful injuries, and in wrongful death cases. There has been some,
but less, tendency to make a distinction between antenuptial torts and
33
McCurdy: Personal Injury Torts between Spouses
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1959
336 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 4: p. 303
conduct during marriage. There has been a strong tendency, almost,
if not entirely, without exception among the more recent decisions, to
allow an action based on respondeat superior against the employer of
the spouse causing the injury, despite the fact that no action would
lie by the injured spouse against the other, and despite also the fact
that the right of the employer to recover over from the employee has
the potential of making the employee indirectly liable to his injured
spouse. Otherwise a distinction based on the difference between con-
duct within business activities and that within the activities of family
life has not been found except in some parent and child cases.'
At common law for a combination of reasons, usually summed
up in the concept of unity of husband and wife, no cause of action
arose or could be maintained between spouses for tortious conduct.
Whether after enactment of married women's acts and related legis-
lation such cause of action can arise or can be maintained has been
considered to depend upon statutory construction. Few statutes are
express upon this question. The terminology of most of the statutes
is consistent with either conclusion. The majority view takes the
position that such statutes should be strictly construed; the minority,
that they should be liberally construed. The question is usually assumed
to be to what extent has there been a departure from the unity con-
cept. This concept is almost without exception, considered by both
views as having been abrogated in matters of property. The majority
view considers that it has not been abrogated in the matter of tort
liability for injuries affecting the person; the minority, that it has
been entirely abrogated except in the matter of marital rights and
obligations. However, supposed policy reasons are often advanced or
denied, the principal ones being that actions between husband and
wife tend to marital disharmony and to disruption of domestic peace
and tranquillity, and in the matter of negligent conduct where there
is liability insurance would tend to marital fraudulent collusion.
There is no reason to think that in the case of intentional, wilful,
and wanton injury an action would disrupt domestic harmony, since
the conduct leading to the action has already caused the disruption;
and indeed there is every reason to think that denial of an action might
be more disruptive in that it might lead to resort to other admittedly
available redress such as to be found in the criminal and divorce law.
Besides, a substantial number of states have for years allowed such
171. See Worrell v. Worrell, 174 Va. 11, 4 S.E.2d 343 (1939) ; Lusk v. Lusk,
113 W. Va. 17, 166 S.E. 538 (1932).
Cf. however note 103 supra.
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interspousal tort actions either by decision or by express statute and
it would be impossible to demonstrate that more domestic disharmony
exists because of it. In the case of negligent injury where there is
liability insurance it is quite implausible to think that a civil damage
action would be productive of domestic disharmony except in the
employer cases if the employee is not covered. The danger of fraudu-
lent collusion is more plausible. But is there any indication that there
would be more danger of fraudulent claims than in cases between
persons not so related, and that the courts cannot cope with the one
as well as the other? In a substantial number of states interspousal
actions for negligent injury have also for years been allowed. And
again neither the extent of such claims can be given nor the extent
of suspected marital collusion be demonstrated even by liability in-
surers who would be in a position to have figures in such cases if
it were thought sufficiently worthwhile. Questions of policy should
not be injected and determined by purely a priori conceptions. 172
Admittedly there was no interspousal tort action allowed at com-
mon law. But attitudes of society in respect to activities and rights
of women, married and unmarried, within or without the family have
substantially and perhaps basically changed during the past century. 78
And the common law has within itself the capacity of development and
adaptation to new or changed conditions. 74 But the majority view
would result in judicially freezing the common law of a long by-
gone era.
Where a statute does not forbid or clearly preclude tort actions
between spouses for personal injury the judicial approach should be
that the unity concept of husband and wife has ceased to be a legal
concept in matters affecting the person as well as in matters affecting
172. See Crownhart, J., dissenting in Wick v. Wick, 192 Wis. 260, 264-5, 212
N.W. 787, 789 (1927), a case holding that a minor child cannot maintain a personal
injury tort action against his parent although the court had previously held that a wife
could maintain such action against her husband: "Courts may prophesy, but the
practice often leads to embarrassment," referring to the fact that in 1875 the court
had denied women permission to practice law because it would be a gravest in-
jury to them and to their social and moral relations, yet after 1878 when a statute
was enacted opening admission to the bar to women, the prophecy did not ma-
teralize; also to the fact that in 1890 the court denied married women a right
of action for alienation of affections predicting that if allowed, such actions would
be numberless (held again in 1903 stare decisis) yet after 1905 when a statute provided
for it expressly, the predicted result did not follow.
173. See DIcEY, LAW AND PUBLIC OPINION IN ENGLAND DURING THE NINE-
TEENTH CENTURY 371-98 (2d ed. 1920). See also GRAVESON AND CRANE, A CENTURY
Op FAMILY LAW (1957).
174. See State v. Culver, 23 N.J. 495, 505, 129 A.2d 715, 721 (1957) ; Oppenheim
v. Kridel, 236 N.Y. 156, 140 N.E. 227 (1923) (23 COLuM. L. Rv. 683; 8 CORNELL
L.Q. 254; 7 MINN. L. REv. 428; 71 U. PA. L. REv. 395; 9 VA. L. REG. (n.s.) 553;
33 YALE L.J. 107).
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property, and that interests of a spouse in the redress of injuries to
the person should be given recognition no less than interests in the
protection of and redress of injuries to property. The pertinent ques-
tion should be whether there is unprivileged conduct tortious in char-
acter. Apart from conjugal rights the exercise of which would be
ordinarily privileged and only the abuse of which would be wrongful,
there are factors present in the relation of husband and wife that might
well lead to a conclusion that conduct that would be tortious if occur-
ring between persons not husband and wife is not necessarily tortious.
Normal interspousal conduct is not the same as that between others
either in the case of intentional acts or in the case of carelessness.
Acts that are reasonable in view of the close relation, and carelessness
in the operation of the home or in common activities should be dis-
tinguished from conduct not so referable and which would be actionable
if the parties were not husband and wife.175 Courts should not be
unable to deal with such distinctions. Establishment and development
of standards appropriate for application to human behavior, with
variations depending upon particular circumstances, are familiar func-
tions of the judicial process.
175. See McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relation, 43 HARV. L.
Rvv. 1030, 1055 (1930).
See also Sanford, Personal Torts Within the Family, 9 VAND. L. Rgv. 823
(1956); comment, 51 Nw. U.L. Rrv. 610 (1956).
See further Farage, Recovery for Torts Between Spouses, 10 IND. L.J. 290, 300
(1935) ; Albertsworth, Recognition of New Interests in the Law of Torts, 10 CAL.
L. REv. 461 (1922).
[VOL. 4: p. 303
36
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 3 [1959], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol4/iss3/1
